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SELLING RECLAMATION WATER RIGHTS: A 
CASE STUDY IN FEDERAL SUBSIDY POLICY 
Joseph L. Sax* 
It is the age old battle over who is to cash in on the unearned increment in land 
values created by a public investment.-Harold L. Ickesl 
T HE federal reclamation program was designed to provide work-ing farmers with irrigation water at prices they could afford: 
The farmers got their water at low prices, but in the process they got 
something else even more important-the right to continue to re-
ceive that share of water year after year.2 In the arid reclamation 
states, assurance of a continuing, dependable supply of irrigation 
water is an extremely valuable asset. A piece· of dry land may be 
almost worthless, but that same tract with a reliable water supply 
will generally be worth a substantial amount of money. Since the 
worth of the water right is thus typically reflected in land values, one 
who sells a farm in a reclamation project may also receive payment 
for this valuable right.3 Moreover, since the asset which is being 
thus marketed was created by the investment of public funds in the 
construction of the project,4 the effect is that the seller converts the 
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1. DE Roos, THE THIRSTY LAND 167 (1948). 
2. See Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 297 (1958); Ickes v. Fox, 
300 U.S. 82 (1937); 32 Stat. 390 (1902), 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1964). 
3. See, e.g., a letter to the author from the manager of the Wellton-Mohawk Ir-
rigation and Drainage District, Arizona, April 5, 1965, which reports that while "there 
is no 'water right' sold with the land ••• the value of a right to receive water from the 
District is of course reflected in the price of the land itself." Wellton-Mohawk is one 
of many districts which operate on the model of a public utility, retailing water to 
users on an annual contract basis. As the letter indicates, 1he opportunity to realize 
water right profits exists in such situations just as it does on projects where the user 
is viewed as having a more traditional sort of property interest in the water. 
4. Misunderstanding sometimes arises·out of the calculatedly ambiguous claim that 
"reclamation pays its way." This is true in the narrow sense that the construction 
costs allocated to irrigation are required to be repaid. However, an examination of 
the way in which these costs are repaid makes it indisputably clear that the reclama-
tion investment is an enormous subsidy for the benefit of irrigation users. Under 
standard reclamation law, construction costs. may be repaid over a forty-year period, 
with no interest whatever. 53 Stat. 1193 (1939), 43 U.S.C. § 485h(d) (1964). This period 
may be preceded by a ten-year development period in which no repayment at all need 
be made. Ibid. Moreover, during the repayment years, the obligation can be dis-
tributed so that most of the cost is not due until the later years. See, e.g., S. Doc. No. 
92, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1964). Under another option in the law, certain costs 
can be deferred indefinitely. 53 Stat. 1193 (1939), 43 U.S.C. § 485h(e) (1964). Finally 
and perhaps most importantly, about 65% of the costs allocated to irrigation are 
actually repaid by power revenues. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE FOR HOUSE COMM. 
ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., RECLAMATION-ACCOMPLISH-
MENTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 52 (Comm. Print No. 1). For an example of how the subsidy. 
[13] 
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reclamation subsidy into cash, which he realizes as a private capital 
profit at the expense of his successors on the project. 
That this situation is no mere loophole in search of an oppor-
tunist, but is rather an existing problem of considerable propor-
tions, can be illustrated by recent events on the well-known 
Colorado-Big Thompson Project. The project area includes both 
agricultural and municipal users, and because of significant urban 
growth the limited supply of project water is much in demand. The 
various users have an allotment which entitles them to receive a fixed 
fractional share of the project's supply. There is an obligation to 
repay construction costs to the United States, but, typically, the 
terms are such as to reduce repayment to only a small fraction of 
the original public investment. The water rights are thus provided 
as a public subsidy but are held and sold, under current practice, as 
a private asset. By latest report, municipalities within the project 
were required to pay one hundred dollars to get the right to receive 
an acre-foot unit of water out of the annual allotment. 0 When it 
is considered that this district processed transfers of more than 
eleven thousand acre feet of water during 1963-1964,6 the magnitude 
of the potential- profit becomes obvious. 
What is happening on the Big Thompson Project is perhaps 
especially dramatic because water rights, as such, are openly bought 
and sold and because the market is a relatively active and affluent 
one. Nevertheless, precisely the same possibility of reaping a large 
capital profit from the public investment can occur on any project 
when a farm is sold at a gross price of which a significant portion 
represents the value of the project water right. For example, one 
irrigation district in Oregon recently reported that when project 
water became available in 1961, land values increased from about 
fifty dollars per acre to as high as two hundred fifty dollars per 
acre.7 
operates, see the Department of Interior's presentation in Hearings on S. 912 Before a 
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Public Lands, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 
(1947). 
It is assumed in the following discussion that free market sales of a commodity 
provided by a subsidy will generally result in substantial profits to the seller. Where 
that is not the case, and sales involve the mere recovery of payments made to the 
United States, the proposal to be suggested here is self-adjusting, and such a seller 
would not be penalized. See note 88 infra. 
5. Boulder Daily Camera, May 12, 1964, p. I, col. 5. The price is even higher than 
it seems, since in below-average years a unit will provide substantially less than one 
acre foot of water. 
6. [1963-1964] NORTHERN COLO. WATER CONSERVANCY DIST, ANN, REP. OF THE SECRE• 
TARY MANAGER 5. 
7. Letter to author from Secretary-Treasurer of Klamath Basin Improvement Dis• 
trict, Oregon:, March 30, 1965; 
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This situation raises some interesting questions about federal 
reclamation policy and about subsidy policy in general. Why should 
a program designed to give a needed service at reasonable rates 
evolve into one where the original recipients, at the end of their 
time of need, are also rewarded by the gift of a large capital asset? 
Moreover, why should that reward be given at the expense of their 
successors on the project, who, one would think, are equally the 
concern of the reclamation program? These are the questions ·with 
which this article will be concerned. 
I. THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM 
The problem of private profit-taking exists today b~cause the 
federal government refrains from imposing price controls on the 
sale of reclamation water rights. It refuses to attempt to prevent the 
seller from realizing the so-called "incremental value"8 which ac-
crues when a farm acquired at dry-land prices is sold at a price 
which incorporates the market value of the federal investment in 
reclamation. That refusal is not based on the impossibility of such 
a restriction, for similar restrictions have been employed in the 
past. Indeed, one mystery with which we must deal is the ground 
upon which the Department of the Interior, the administrator of 
the reclamation laws, bases its refusal to act. Never fully articulated, 
the Department's reasoning appears to rest upon some combination 
of the following three reasons: First, and most important, Congress 
does not want (or has prohibited) control of sales of water rights; 
second, such restrictions are somehow inconsistent with the under-
lying purposes of reclamation policy and the private property sys-
tem in which it operates; and third, even if such controls were 
permissible and desirable, they are administratively impracticable. 
The discussion which follows will consider and ultimately re-
ject each of these reasons. It will conclude that Congress has not 
prohibited such controls, that a rational reclamation policy de-
mands them, and that they are practicable and should be implemented 
forthwith.9 Of all these issues, ascertaining the congressional attitude 
8. As used here, "incremental value" means the market value of the right to re-
ceive project water. "In practice 'incremental value' has been defined as the amount 
realized from the sale of land in excess of [the sum of] (1) original appraisal, (2) ap• 
praised value of improvements, (3) construction charges paid and (4) twice the amount 
of any previous payments to the district." U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, LANDOWNERSHIP SUR-
VEY ON FEDERAL RECLAMATION PROJECI'S 48 (1946) [hereinafter cited as LANDOWNERSHIP 
SURVEY]. 
9. The ,two statutory provisions which deal most closely with the rights of users 
are in no sense determinative of the question at issue here. See 32 Stat. 389, 390 
(1902), 43 U.S.C. §§ 431, 372 (1964). Moreover, it should be clear that merely because 
a user may have a right to continue his use and not be cut off, 70 Stat. 483 (1956), 43 
l6 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 64:13 
is perhaps the most complex. The applicable statute seems, on its 
face, to suggest that the reaping of incremental values is not to be 
forbidden except in one special situation: the sale of large estates 
-so-called excess lands.10 However, this appearance conceals a 
legislative view which, although twisted and shifting, is far more 
sympathetic to the general prohibition of private profit-taking than 
current administration would suggest. Our first task, therefore, 
must be an analysis of the legislative history of control of incre-
mental value sales. 
JI. EARLY HISTORY OF RECLAMATION LEGISLATION 
The provisions of the original reclamation act, which came 
fairly late in the history of the nation,11 clearly reflect the influence 
of two important factors. First, the disposition of the public domain 
had been plagued by monopolization and speculation, which had 
continuously frustrated the underlying purpose of opening the fed-
eral domain to settlement-the creation of a class of self-reliant 
family farmers.12 To ensure that the reclamation program would 
not be similarly frustrated, the framers of the 1902 act devised a 
series of anti-monopoly and anti-speculation provisions. Chief among 
them were the prohibition against the sale of reclamation water 
rights for use on more than 160 acres in single ownership, the re-
quirement that users be bona fide residents upon the land, and the 
condition that reclamation water be appurtenant to the land.13 It 
was thought that these three rules would prevent land monopoliza-
tion and profiteering by large corporations to the detriment of the 
intended beneficiaries of the act.14 
The second factor was a determination that reclamation should 
carry its mvn weight to the extent possible. Thus, the law required 
users to repay to the United States the capital investment in con-
struction. Although repayment was to be without interest, the full 
costs of construction were to be returned in ten years' time.1G To 
what extent repayment was a calculated new departure in the theory 
of government aid and to what extent it was a political expedient to 
U.S.C. § 485h-1{4) (1964), he does not necessarily also have the right to sell his use to 
another for a profit. See Sax, Problems of Federalism in Reclamation Law, 37 U. 
CoLO. L. R.Ev. 49, 64 (1964). It is only the latter alleged right with which we are con-
cerned here. 
IO. See 44 Stat. 649 (1926), as amended, 70 Stat. 524 (1956), 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1964), 
11. 32 Stat. 388 (1902) (now codified in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.). 
12. See LANDOWNERSHIP SURVEY 61-73, 91. 
13. 32 Stat. 389, 390 (1902), 43 U.S.C. §§ 431, 372 (1964). 
14. See Taylor, The Excess Land Law-Execution of a Public Policy, 64 YALE L.J. 
476, 484-86 (1955). 
15. 32 Stat. 389 (1902). 
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win the needed votes of midwestem congressmen is unclear and, 
from today's perspective, irrelevant. In any event, a limited subsidy 
concept in the form of a repayment obligation was built into the 
basic fabric of reclamation law. 
The inadequacy of the anti-speculation clauses and the unrealis-
tic harshness of the repayment formula soon led to disaster. The 
provisions so carefully designed to prevent profiteering in water 
failed to take account of the fact that the economic value of the 
water could and would be reflected in land values. Since there were 
no adequate restrictions on land transactions, a fatal combination of 
events took place.16 In the face of a rising market, landowners were 
induced to refrain from selling in the hope that time would drive 
real estate prices even higher. Since a good deal of the property was 
held by owners of large tracts who could afford to wait and speculate, 
much land was held off the market and not settled at all dm:;ing 
the early years. This result was, of course, contrary to the congres-
sional desire that the projects be settled and cultivated and that 
the o,vners of the maximum amount of land begin repaying the 
construction charges which had been expended. At the same time, 
however, those lands which were put upon the market brought 
enormous profits. The extent of the speculative excesses is indicated 
by the fact that the average price increase on project lands during 
the first decade of reclamation exceeded 750 per cent.17 This in-
crease was nearly seven times the general rise in farm land prices 
in reclamation states during the same period.18 
The rate of economic failures created by the combination of 
land speculation and a rigid repayment schedule was tremendous, 
and the settlers naturally turned to Congress for relief. The precise 
question was whether the repayment obligation should be reduced 
in order to permit the settlers on the projects to survive :financially, 
but at the same time to permit the selling lando,vners to reap their 
profits. 
In the context in which the problem arose, the solution appeared 
easy. Those who had been profiting at the expense of the repayment 
fund were principally large landowners and speculators whom there 
was neither need nor desire to aid. They were merely parasites-
16. This history is reviewed in DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, STUDY PREPARED PURSUANT TO 
A REsoLUTION OF THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR .AFFAIRS, 88TH CONG., 2D 
SESS., ACREAGE LIMITATION PoucY 6 (Comm. Print 1964) [hereinafter cited as ACREAGE 
LIMITATION PouCY]. These early developments are also discussed in the Landownership 
Survey and in the report of the Special Advisors on Reclamation, Federal Reclamation 
by Irrigation, S. Doc. No. 92, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. !}6-4-0 (1924). 
17. 33 U.S. BUREAU OF R.Ecr.AMATION, THE RECLAMATION ERA 178-79 (1947). 
18. Ibid. 
18 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 64:1!1 
real estate manipulators who, without ever settling on or improving 
the land themselves, reaped enormous profits from the enthusiasm 
and naYvete of the true settlers to whom they sold. The need ap-
peared to be merely to get the land into the hands of genuine settlers 
with dispatch and at reasonable prices. Once that had been done 
and the speculators had been squeezed out, the basic structure of 
the reclam.ation plan could go forward as originally planned. The 
true settlers would prosper, and the investment of the United States 
would be once again secure. 
JI!. HISTORY OF INCREMENTAL VALUE CONTROLS 
A. Limited Attempt To Curb Speculative Excesses-
Price Control of Excess Land 
It was with this background that Congress passed the Reclama-
tion Extension Act of 1914.19 Its principal purpose was to grant a 
permanent enlargement of the repayment period from ten to 
twenty years, but it also made the first significant attempt to deal 
with the problem of speculative excesses. As previously noted, the 
task as it then appeared was "to cope with the special problem 
of initially breaking up these excess holdings and preventing the 
o-wners from capitalizing on the benefits of Federal construction 
in the form of high prices charged to purchasers of their lands."20 
In pursuance of this goal, a number of provisions were enacted to 
induce sales by making it burdensome and expensive to hold land 
out of production. In addition, the requirement was added that, be-
fore construction began on any project, the Secretary must require 
project landowners "to agree to dispose of all lands in excess of the 
area which he shall deem sufficient for the support of a family upon 
the land in question, upon such terms and at not to exceed such 
price as the Secretary of the Interior may designate .... "21 This 
section provided the basic structure upon which subsequent incre-
mental value provisions were built; it is therefore important to be 
clear about its purpose. Notably, it did not represent a declaration 
that the original bona fide settlers should have the benefit of incre-
mental values for themselves. It was, rather, a negative law; it merely 
provided that the speculators (owners of excess land) should not 
have any such profit. The question with which we are concerned-
distribution of profits in subsequent sales-was not before the 
Congress in 1914. It was having enough trouble getting the first 
generation started to worry about what might happen thereafter. 
19. 38 Stat. 686 (1914)., 
20. ACREAGE LIMITATION POLICY 7. 
21. 38 Stat. 689 (1914), 43 U.S.C. § 418 (1964). 
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B. Early Proposal for Broader Control Over 
Incremental Profits 
19 
The problem of subsequent sales was not long in being raised. 
For a vari~ty of technical reasons, it soon became obvious that the 
measures taken in 1914 were not sufficient to alleviate the financial 
difficulties of the reclamation projects,22 and in 1923 the President 
appointed a panel of distinguished citizens to _make a comprehensive 
_ study of the program. 
The report of this group,23 the so-called Fact Finders Committee, 
is most interesting. It recognized for the first time that competition 
for the benefits of the federally provided incremental values existed 
not only bettveen "speculators" and "settlers," but also among bona 
fide settlers themselves. As the Fact Finders noted, there would 
inevitably be some turnover of reclamation lands. Many of the set~ 
tlers who had initially come on the project would eventually sell 
out to succeeding settlers for a variety of legitimate reasons such 
as death, ill health, or restlessness.24 The first settlers may have ob-
tained their lands at low dry-land prices, but after the implementa-
tion of reclamation measures the lands had a market value inflated 
by the presence of irrigation water. The selling settlers were reaping 
this increment as a capital profit. Although these sellers, unlike the 
"pure" speculators, were meant to be the beneficiaries of the fed-
eral investment, so were the buying settlers. To permit the selling 
settler to reap the value of the water right as a profit meant that he 
would do so at the expense of the buying settler, thus reducing the 
financial stability of those persons subsequently coming onto the 
project. The Report described the situation thus: 
[T]he [transferring] farmer sold his equity in the farm unit 
and the water contract at a price over and above the money he 
had actually paid out. The purchaser was under the obliga-
tion of paying to the Government the usual annual install-
ments, and in addition the premium paid to the former owner. 
After several such transfers have occurred, each one at a price 
above the cost to the previous owner, the ultimate purchaser 
often carries an obligation to the respective purchasers which 
overshadows in magnitude the obligations to the Government. 
When the pressure of this heavy obligation weighs upon him, 
he is likely to blame his condition on the Government reclama-
tion plan, when, as a matter of fact, the project construction 
and the operatio.n and maintenance charges are small com-
pared with the other obligations that he has to meet. Such a 
22. LANnoWNERSHIP SURVEY 42. 
23. S. Doc. No. 92, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924). 
24. Id. at 112-14. 
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pyramiding of costs is most unfortunate, for it is nearly always 
disastrous to the credit and to the peace of mind of the farmer.2G 
The Fact Finders thus saw clearly the basic dilemma with which 
we are principally concerned-the allocation of incremental land 
values among successive generations of settlers on the project. It 
is important to note, however, that the similarity between their 
concern and ours is only partial. They saw a conflict between the 
generations of settlers only to the extent that there was a threat to 
the survival of the buyer and the secµrity of the repayment obliga-
tion. Implicit in this limited concern is the assumption that if the 
buyer's security could be assured, it would be perfectly proper to 
permit the seller to reap the incremental value. The soundness of 
that assumption is at the very center of our concern here. We ask 
the questions why, and under what financial circumstances, the 
selling ( earlier) settler should be preferred over the buying (later) 
settler in the distribution of a publicly conferred benefit. This dif-
ference is critical because the assumption that financial security is 
the sole consideration in determining· the role of incremental 
profits pervades all congressional action, as we shall see, and gives 
support to the claim made here that Congress never decided, and 
never really considered, the issue with which we are concerned. 
In any event, the Fact Finders did come to grips with their 
discovery that speculation was not limited merely to the initial dis-
position of large landholdings. They drafted a bill regulating all 
sales of all irrigable lands, both excess and non-excess, until all 
construction charges had been paid. It provided that project lands 
were to be appraised at their value without reference to the pro-
posed project (in essence their value as dry land) and that "upon 
any and every sale of the land or any interest therein" the seller 
must turn over to the United States half of the amount by which 
the sale price exceeded the appraisal price.26 The Fact Finders' 
proposal itself did not become law, but twice in the next two years 
Congress affirmed the principle that broad control over incremental 
value sales should be exercised. 
C. Legislation Extending Price Control to All 
Project Land 
Both the San Carlos Project Act of 192427 and the Interior De-
partment Appropriation Act of 1925,28 which authorized a number 
25. Id. at 113; see also id. at 37. 
26. Id. at 204-06; H.R. 8836, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924). 
27. 43 Stat. 475 (1924). 
28. 43 Stat. 1141 (1925). 
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of projects, contained a requirement that no expenditures should 
be made until a repayment contract had been executed containing 
a provision for an appraisal, showing the present actual bona 
fide value of all such irrigable land [all lands under the project] 
fixed without reference to the proposed construction . . . and 
[a provision] that until one-half the construction charges against 
said lands shall have been fully paid no sale of any such lands 
shall be valid unless and until the purchase price involved in 
such sale is approved by the Secretary of the Interior .... 29 
This approach incorporated two highly significant changes from 
that used in the 1914 Extension Act. First, the restriction was to be 
operative until half the construction charges were repaid. Second, 
it was worded to prohibit the taking of incremental profits not only 
in the original sale of excess land to a settler, but also in subsequent 
sales of project lands.30 I£ the quoted requirement meant to accom-
plish what its language indicates, its enactment marked a milestone 
in reclamation policy. Up to this time, as we have noted, congres-
sional concern with speculation was limited to that period when 
land was first being put into production. In contrast, however, the 
1924 and 1925 .i.cts contain no such limitation. Their language 
covers not only initial sales of excess lands, but also subsequent sales 
between· settlers. 
That this was the result intended seems corroborated by the· 
element of the requirement which covered all sales until half the 
construction charges were paid off. These charges were enacted 
during the period in which Congress was enlarging the total re-
payment period to forty years;31 indeed, at the time of the 1925 act 
the operative repayment provision was indefinite in duration, with 
annual payments being based upon a percentage of gross income.82 
In light of these developments, it would seem to have been antici-
29. Authorization for the Yakima Project, Kittitas Division, 43 Stat. 1170 (1925). 
The other authorizations contained provisions similar in scope, but not identical in 
language. It should be noted that the San Carlos Project Act and the 1925 Appropria-
tion Act differed from the Fact Finders' proposal in that a general power of control 
over the purchase price in the Secretary was substituted for the specific requirement 
that 50% of the increment be returned to the United States. T:he debate on the Fact 
Finders' proposal suggests that the reason for ·this was not an objection to broad incre-
mental value control as such, but rather skepticism as to whether the precise formula 
urged by the Fact Finders (which failed, for example, ·to give credit to the seller for 
improvements he had made) was fair. See Hearings on H.R. 8836 and H.R. 9611 
Before the House Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 
38-45, 314-41 (1924). 
30. For example, the provision ordinarily would control a sale by a b,ona fide settler 
who had worked the land for six or eight years and who had become ill or decided to 
retire. 
31. 44 Stat. 648 (1926), 43 U.S.C. § 423d (1964). 
32, Section 4, subsec. F, 43 Stat. 702 (1924), repealed, 44 Stat. 650 (1926). 
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pated that the sale-price restriction would be in effect for a very 
long time and would probably apply to several resales of the project 
lands. 
However, this provision restricting sales until half the costs 
were repaid cuts the other way, too. It is a limitation, and thus sug-
gests some congressional reservations about denying the selling 
settler incremental profits, even at the risk of losing some of the 
repayment contracted for. 
The two-edged aspect of the restriction is just the visible sign of 
a tangled background of legislative indecisiveness of which we shall 
see even more in .the history of subsequent statutes.83 In any event, 
despite some inconsistency, the 1924 and 1925 acts seem clearly to 
represent a congressional willingness to impose broad and long-
lasting restrictions on incremental value sales. 
D. Section 46 of the Omnibus Adjustment Act-A Tangled 
Piece of Legislative Draf tmanship 
The next events of interest took place in 1926, when Congress 
passed two important laws. The first was the annual Interior De-
partment appropriation law, which, like that of 1925, authorized 
some specific reclamation projects.34 The second was the Omnibus 
Adjustment Act,35 a reclamation law of general application which 
is still in force. The statutes were enacted within fifteen days of 
each other and contain identical anti-speculation provisions. The 
relevant language, now best known as section 46 of the Omnibus 
Adjustment Act, stated that henceforth contracts between the United 
States and the users' associations must provide that: 
[A]ll irrigable land held in private ownership by any one 
owner in excess of one hundred and sixty irrigable acres shall 
be appraised ... and the sale prices thereof fixed by the Secre-
tary on the basis of its actual bona fide value ... without refer-
ence to the proposed construction . . . and that no such excess 
33. It is noteworthy that 91e Bureau of Reclamation had no such reservations 
about what ought to be done. During the hearings on the appropriation bill, the Com• 
missioner of Reclamation put into evidence the repayment contract he proposed to use. 
Hearings on the Interior Department Appropriation Bill for 1926 Before a Subcom-
mittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 68th Cong., 2d Sess, 533·36 (1924), 
It provided in detail that an appraisal, excluding speculative values, was to be made 
of "all district lands." Id. at 534. If any lands in the district were sold for an amount 
in excess of the appraisal price, 50% of that excess would be payable to the irrigation 
district to be credited on the construction obligation. The contract expressly provided 
that it was to apply not only to the first sale to an eligible settler where profits would 
be those of a mere land profiteer, but also to a "second sale, or third or additional 
sale." Id. at 535. 
34. 44 Stat. 478 (1926). Included were some reauthorizations of projects which had 
been approved in the 1925 act. 
35. 44 Stat. 636 (1926). 
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lands so held shall receive water from any project or division if 
the owners thereof shall refuse to execute valid recordable 
contracts for the sale of such lands under terms and conditions 
satisfactory to the Secretary of the Interior and at prices not to 
exceed those fixed by the Secretary of the Interior; and that until 
one-half the construction charges against such lands shall have 
been fully paid no sale of any such lands shall carry the right 
to receive water unless and until the purchase price involved in 
such sale is approved by the Secretary .... 36 
This provision is the successor to the 1924 and 1925 acts and is still 
the principal anti-speculation provision in the reclamation laws. It 
is, therefore, necessary to examine it in some detail. On its face, 
section 46 seems to embody a dramatic change of policy from the 
1924 and 1925 laws, and from the recommendations of the Fact 
Finders, for it seems to reject the principle of general price control 
and to limit such controls solely to sales of excess lands. If indeed 
this was what Congress desired, it would explain the current ad-
ministrative refusal to take action against private profit-taking in 
the publicly created reclamation water values. Unfortunately, a 
mere perusal of the face of section 46 is not enough; behind the 
unexamined statutory wording lurks a grammatical and legal puzzle 
of some complexity. 
To solve that puzzle, it is first necessary to recall that anti-specu-
lation provisions in the reclamation laws were of two types. One 
was designed to accelerate the disposition of large landholdings; 
the other was to control prices when lands were sold. The excerpt 
quoted above from the 1925 law deals only with the second prob-
lem, price control.87 It requires the execution of a repayment con-
tract between the Secretary and the water district agreeing that land 
sales be subject to control by the Secretary. To the extent that the 
1925 law concerned itself-with the problem of breaking- up excess 
landholdings, it employed a quite different procedure described sepa-
rately in the statute.38 That procedure required that an entirely 
different contract be executed between the particular state involved 
and the United States, in which the state undertook the "duty and 
responsibility" of breaking up excess landholdings and securing 
settlers to improve the land.39 
The excerpt quoted above from the Omnibus Adjustment Act 
36. 44 Stat. 650 (1926), 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1964). 
37. Text accompanying note 29 supra. The same is true of the parallel portion of 
the 1924 San Carlos Project Act. Section 4, 43 Stat. 476 (1924). 
38. 43 Stat. 1169, 1170 (1925). The excess land provision is in the same long num-
bered section, but in a separate proviso. 
39. The San Carlos Project Act dealt with excess landholdings by requiring that 
the excess be conveyed to the United States. Section 4, 43 Stat. 476 (1924). 
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of 1926,40 however, includes provisions £or breaking up excess land-
holdings and for controlling prices juxtaposed in the same sentence. 
The reason is that Congress had decided by then to abandon the 
experiment with state responsibility for excess lands and to revert 
to the same device it used for price control-a contract between 
the Secretary and the water district. As st consequence, the drafters 
of the statute were able to consolidate and incorporate both anti-
speculation provisions within a single sentence. Thus the sentence 
could be structured to, read: 
[Such contract or contracts with irrigation ¢listricts hereinbe-
fore referred to shall further provide ... ] 
that no such excess lands so held shall receive water . . . if 
the owners thereof shall refuse to execute valid recordable 
contracts for the sale of such lands . . . 
and that until one-half the construction charges against such 
lands shall have been fully paid no sale of any such lands shall 
carry the right to receive water unless and until the purchase 
price involved in such sale is approved by the Secretary. 
Ordinarily the details of sentence structure and the order of phras-
ing would be an utterly trivial matter, unworthy even of notice. 
However, in this particular situation the consolidation may have 
had a major impact on the administration of reclamation policy. 
If we now tum back to the exact language of the 1926 law, the 
relevance of the consolidation will become apparent. The words of 
the earlier acts relating to restrictions on the sale price of lands-
"until one-half the construction charges against said lands shall 
have been fully paid no sale of any such lands shall ... "-were 
retained without significant change. However, in the 1926 law the 
force-sale provision for excess lands was inserted ahead of the lan-
guage relating to sale-price control. Physically this was a mere con-
solidation of two independent provisions, but grammatically a 
crucial change occurred. Although the language of the sale price 
provision remained the same, the referent of the pronouns changed 
completely. Thus, though the provision still said-as it had in 1924 
and 1925-"said lands" and "such lands," the lands to which "said" 
and "such" refer seem to have changed. In the earlier laws the re-
ferent was as broad as it could be-all irrigable lands under the 
project. In contrast, however, with the insertion of the excess land 
clause in the 1926 laws, the referent, grammatically at least, was 
now merely "all irrigable land held in private ownership by any 
one owner in excess of one hundred and sixty irrigable acres." 
40. Text accompanying note 36 supra. 
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If the Congress meant, in fact, to accomplish what it thus gram-
matically accomplished, then the broad coverage of incremental 
value sales in the legislation of 1924 and 1925 was substantially 
narrowed, and only sales of excess lands would be regulated. In-
deed, as previously noted, current administration imposes only this 
v_ery limited restriction, at least in part because of the view that 
the 1926 provision plainly states that only control of excess land sales 
is intended.41 However, as we have just seen, it is quite possible that 
the apparent restrictiveness of the 1926 provision is the result of 
nothing more than a bizarre grammatical fortuity,42 and that section 
46 in no sense represents a congressional repudiation of broad 
control of incremental value sales .. 
In any attempt to resolve the question of the true meaning of 
the 1926 provision, it should be determined whether Congress ever 
indicated that it was changing the 1924 and 1925 laws or whether 
the apparent grammatical certainty is simply the result of blind 
41. The importance of § 46 to the formulation of administrative policy is some-
what uncertain. No doubt present policy is significantly influenced by congressional 
acquiescence, in the late 1940's and early 1950's, in suggestions that incremental value 
contracts covering non-excess lands should be repudiated and by the repeal of certain 
statutory incremental value provisions. See note 52 infra. However, the repeals were 
based on varying grounds, and in none of them did Congress indicate a desire to 
repudiate the principle of § 46, which has always been viewed as embodying the 
fundamental law. See note 64 infra. 
There has also been a suggestion that broad control of incremental value sales 
could be imposed without regard to the meaning of § 46 under the blanket authority 
given ,the Secretary "to perform any and all acts and to make such 'rules and regula-
dons as may be necessary and proper for the purpose of carrying ,the provisions of 
this act into full force and effect." 32 Stat. 390 (1902), 43 U.S.C. § 373 (1964). See 
LANDOWNERSIDP SURVEY 48. However, :reliance on this section seems misplaced. If 
Congress has spoken specifically on an issue and indicated that it does not want a 
certain thing done, the executive branch certainly ought not to be allowed to do that 
thing anyway on the basis of a general authorizing provision in the applicable statute. 
Those who administe:r the reclamation acts, of all people, should be sensitive to the 
relation between general language and specific language in the law. See Ivanhoe 
Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 291-92 (1958). 
42. Whether the change was purposeful or inadvertent must :remain a matter of 
speculation; the details of the change are most inconclusive. T\he origin of the language 
that became § 46 was an Interior Department draft made in 1925. Re1LTings on the 
Interior Department 1927 Appropriation Bill Before a Subcommittee of the Rouse 
Committee on Appropriations, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 739 (1925). Oddly, this draft 
omitted entirely ·the critical clause beginning "until one-half." That draft thus plainly 
applied only to excess lands, notwithstanding the fact that all previous versions had 
clearly applied to all irrigable lands and the Department itself had openly advocated 
the broader coverage in hearings the preceding year. See note 33 supra. Moreover, in 
presenting this 1925 draft, Commissioner Mead at no point indicated any change in 
departmental policy. Hearings, supra. 
To add to the mystery, the omitted clause, "until one-half •.• ," was apparently 
reinserted by the House Appropriations Committee. See 67 CONG. ~c. 1507, 5782 
(1926); H,R. REP. No. 37, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926). Whether they added this language 
to broaden coverage to non-excess lands or fo:r some other reason is not clear. It is also 
unclear whether they inserted the phrase at the point they did because it had been 
there in the 1924 and 1925 acts (when the excess land provision did not precede it), or 
purposely to follow and be limited by the newly inserted excess land provision. 
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chance. If Congress intended to narrow the earlier provisions, there 
should be some evidence of that intent. In fact, however, an ex-
amination of the legislative history of the 1926 act shows it to be 
wholly barren of any indication that the law was being narrowed.43 
The only affirmative evidence available is to be found in con-
temporary administrative interpretation. In the report of the Bu-
reau of Reclamation for the period ended June 30, 1926,44 which 
was published more than a month after the signing of the Omni-
bus Adjustment Act, Commissioner Mead discussed the Vale Project 
in Oregon. That project was first authorized under the broad lan-
guage of the 1925 act and then reauthorized in 1926 under the 
seemingly more restrictive language there used.45 The Commis-
sioner noted that under the 1925 law the project was made subject 
to "appraisal of private lands to be benefited by the proposed works 
with agreements for sale thereof at the appraised prices."46 Although 
the 1926 statute had just been passed, there is no indication that it 
was thought to have modified control of incremental value sales, 
thereby narrowing the scope of regulation to transfers of excess 
lands only. Moreover, it seems significant that the report speaks 
expansively of "private lands" and not merely of excess land. Since 
it was the Bureau of Reclamation which had recommended the 
broad repayment contract, covering "all transfers" of "all district 
lands," to Congress in the hearings on the 1925 bill,47 it might be 
expected that its report would be careful to distinguish between a 
law which covered all the private lands to be benefited and one 
which covered only excess lands. 
Even more important, the contemporary interpretation by the 
43. Conceivably it could be argued that it is improper to place the burden on the 
history of § 46 to demonstrate that it was an intentional departure from the 1924 
and 1925 laws. Such an argument would suggest that the coverage of § 46, a law 
of general application, should be compared with its predecessor general law, the 1914 
Extension Act, and not with such special and limited laws as the San Carlos Act and 
the Appropriation Act of 1925, or with the Fact Finders' proposal, which never became 
law. It would be further argued that § 46 and the 1914 act are consistent, since both 
deal only with excess lands and since the 1924 and 1925 laws were merely experi-
ments which were tried and abandoned. This is possible, but it seems unlikely that 
such important experiments-the result of years of open reconsideration of reclamation 
policy-would be abandoned before they were given any chance to show their worth 
and that there was utter silence about the rather important decision to abandon them 
and return to the 1914 approach. Nor was silence customary for Congress when aban• 
doning such experiments. The decision to discontinue state participation in breaking 
up excess landholdings, accomplished in the very statutes we have been discussing, was 
accompanied by extensive debate. The stark difference invites skepticism at the least, 
44. (1925-1926] COMM'R OF RECLAMATION ANN. REP. TO THE SEC'Y OF THE INTERIOR 
Z'J. 
45. 43 Stat. 1168 (1925); 44 Stat. 479 (1926). 
46. COMM'R OF RECLAMATION ANN, REP., op. cit. supra note 44, at 27. 
47. See note 33 supra. 
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Secretary of the Interior clearly supports the view that regulation 
of incremental values was not meant to be limited merely to sales 
of excess lands. Only five months after the passage of the 1926 Ap-
propriation Act and the Omnibus Adjustment Act, the Secretary 
entered into a repayment contract for the Owyhee Project.48 That 
project was one of those expressly authorized in -the 1926 Appropri-
ation Act, which contained an anti-speculation provision with lan-
guage identical to section 46 of the Omnibus Adjustment Act.49 
The Secretary included in the contract an anti-speculation provision 
requiring that when sales of project lands were made in excess 9f 
appraised valuation, half of that incremental value must be paid to 
the district as an advance on future construction, operation, and 
maintenance charges.50 The significant fact is that this contractual 
provision was not limited in its coverage merely to excess lands, 
but expressly included non-excess lands.51 While the Owyhee form 
of contract was used extensively only in the Pacific Northwest, it 
was by no means an eccentric or isolated instance. 52 At the least, 
48. Contract betw·een the United States of America and the Owyhee Irrigation 
District, October 14, 1926. 
49. 44 Stat. 479 (1926). 
50. Article 41 of the contract, supra note 48, provided inter alia: 
(B) The amount in dollars by which the price fixed in any future sale of District 
land exceeds the sum of (a) the appraised value of ,the land (as determined 
by the appraisal provided for in subdivision C of this article); (b) the ap-
praised value of the improvements thereon, if any (determined as provided 
in subdivisions C and F of this article); (c) payments, if any, made ito the 
United States on the construction charges upon such lands; and (d) twice .. 
the amount of the payments, if any, made to the District under this article 
upon any previous sale or sales of such land, shall for convenience of refer-
ence be termed the "incremented" value of said land. 
(1) If any of the lands of the District are sold at an incremented value, as de-
fined in subdivision B of this article, the vendor shall pay to the District, 
or the vendee shall pay to the District out of the money which would other-
wise have been payable to the vendor, an amount equal to fifty per centum 
(50%) of such incremented value. 
51. Article 4l(A) provided: "It is understood that this article does not apply to 
any of the old lands of the project excepting the old excess lands, but does apply to all 
new lands and excess lands." Definitions of old and new lands were provided in 
Article 7: 
Lands :having rights in canals now receiving their water supply by means of 
pumping from Snake River, but which will secure their water supply from the 
Owyhee Project after the same is constructed, and participate in the use of the 
project canal system as well as the project reservoir, are herein referred to as the 
"old" lands of the project. Lands which have no rights in the canals now re-
ceiving water by means of pumping from Snake River and which will secure 
their entire water supply from the works of the Owyhee Project are herein re-
ferred to as the "new" lands of the project. • • . , 
52. The history of the Department's use of and attitude toward incremental 
value contracts covering non-excess lands is most interesting. A survey recently made 
of all repayment contracts for the period 1926-1954 shows the following: "Excluding 
contracts which require the provision by reasons of specific legislation (Columbia 
Basin, Tucumcari and WCU projects) [Act of October 14, 1940, 54 Stat. 1119, as 
amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 590y-z (1964)], only 36 out of well over 1,000 contracts con-
tain .the provision •••• Thirty-two out of ,the 36, moreover, involve Pacific North-
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this indicates that the 1926 laws were not viewed as a bar to broad 
control of incremental value sales. 53 
The foregoing analysis is not designed to suggest that section 
46 of the Omnibus Adjustment Act requires the use of incre-
mental value provisions for non-excess lands. It is designed to show, 
however, that section 46 neither forbids the use of such provisions 
nor in any sense necessarily embodies a congressional desire 
that incremental value controls be imposed only on the disposition 
of excess lands. Probably the most that can be said is that Congress 
was groping-not unwilling to accept broad controls when they 
· were included in legislative drafts and not sufficiently concerned 
to make sure that the broad coverage did not slip out of the laws. 
The conclusions intended at this point are merely: (1) that broad 
price control of non-excess land sales has been at least acceptable 
to Congress and to the officials entrusted with the administration 
of the reclamation laws; (2) that Congress did not, in 1926, reject 
the use of such controls; and (3) that therefore whether such con-
trols ought to be employed is a question that turns on congressional 
intent since 1926, to the extent that it is relevant, and upon an 
inquiry into what incremental value policy would best advance the 
goals of the reclamation program. Before embarking upon an analy-
sis of the policy question, we must pause briefly to examine the 
legislative history since 1926. 
west projects •••. " Letter from Edward Weinberg, Deputy Solicitor, Dept. of the 
Interior to author, June 1965. By contrast, reports and testimony of Department of• 
ficials usually give the impression that such contracts were quite widely used. Sec, 
e.g., H.R. REP. No. 448, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1949); Hearings on S. 2172 Before 
the Senate Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation To Prevent Speculation in Lands 
in the Columbia Basin, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31 (1937); Memorandum From the 
Commissioner of Reclamation to J. A. Krug, Secretary of the Interior Gune 16, 1948) 
(copy in the author's possession). "In any event, from 1954, if not earlier, it lias not 
been departmental policy ·to include in contracts sale price controls on non-excess 
lands." Letter from Edward Weinberg to author, March 29, 1965. 
53. The validity of the Owyhee contract was challenged on ,the ground that the 
Secretary had no authority to control non-excess land sales. Terra v. Pinney & Owyhee 
Irrigation Dist., No. 4829E, Cir. Ct., Malheur County, Ore., Jan. 27, 1937 (decision re-
printed in 27 U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, THE RECLAMATION ERA 128 (1937)), The 
court sustained the validity of the contract, but the opinion is so unsatisfactory that 
neither the precise ground of the objection nor the basis for sustaining the Secretary's 
authority is clear. It has been suggested that the cases turned on the broad authority 
given to the Secretary in § 10 of the 1902 act (see note 41 supra; sec also 3 
PRESIDENT'S WATER R.EsOURCES POLICY COMM'N, WATER R.EsOURCES LAW 232 (1950)), 
but that conclusion is not at all clear from the Oregon court's opinion, Such an 
interpretation of the opinion would seem to be supported by the fact that the incre-
mental value provision was to be in effect for the whole term of the repayment obliga-
tion (Contract, supra note 48, art. 4l[L]) and not merely until half the costs were 
repaid. 
November 1965] Selling Reclamation Water Rights 29 
E. Legislative Developments After 1926' 
Congress enacted no anti-speculation legislation for more than 
a decade after the passage of the 1926 laws. Then, in 1937, it passed 
a special law for the Columbia Basin Project.54 While this statute 
was limited in its application solely to that project and has since 
been repealed,65 its background is worth examining, for it is illus-
trative of congressional una,vareness of the specific problem at 
issue here. 
The 1937 Columbia Basin law was phrased more expansively 
than any anti-speculation law Congress had ever previously -con-
sidered. It expressly required the restriction of incremental value 
sales on "all irrigable lands whether initially excess or non-excess,"56 
and it imposed that requirement until the repayment obligation had 
been entirely liquidated.67 The purpose of this restriction, however, 
was not to grant the incremental value subsidy to the buying settler 
in preference to the selling settler. There was no recognition what-
ever of the issue with which we are concerned-choosing how the 
benefit should be distributed as between the competing interests 
of the settlers. 
The sole purpose of the restriction, according to its draftsman, 
was to secure the government's repayment rights by preventing 
the possibility of a ruinous speculation "during the period that we 
still have a financial interest in this project."58 Thus, here as in 
earlier times, the only issue that was seen to be raised by incre-
mental value sales was that of jeopardizing the security of the re-
payment obligation. Again it was assumed that if repayment were 
secure, it would obviously be proper to remove all restrictions on 
incremental sales and to give the benefit of increased land values 
to the settler. There is no evidence that it was ever called to the 
attention of Congress that there are two competing classes of bona 
fide settlers-the selling settlers and the buying settlers-and that 
a legitimate issue existed as to which of them should be preferred 
in distributing the benefit of incremental values, regardless of the 
54. 50 Stat. 208 (1937). 
55. The anti-speculation provision of the 1937 act was superseded by 57 Stat. 14 
(1943), the relevant provisions of which were repealed by 76 Stat. 678 (1962). See also 
52 Stat. 211 (1938), repealed 6~ Stat. 556 (1955); 54 Stat. 1121 (1940), 16 U.S.C. § 590z-
2(c)(5) (1964). 
56. 50 Stat. 209. (1937). 
57. The act did not expressly so provide, but that intent was made quite explicit 
by the bill's draftsman, the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior. Hearings on 
s. 2172 Before the Senate Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation To Prevent 
speculation in Lands in the Columbia Basin, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 29, 31 (1937). 
58. Hearings on S. 2172, supra note 57, at 29. 
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status of repayment. All through the years, Congress automatically 
equated "settler" with "selling settler." 
For this reason, it appears that when it was possible to persuade 
Congress that the people on the project would be able to meet their 
repayment obligations, Congress was ready to remove all restric-
tions on incremental value sales. That is precisely what has been 
done. Beginning in the 1940's, as repayment stabilized the Depart• 
ment of the Interior took the position that incremental value re-
strictions were no longer necessary. Perhaps the first step in this 
last phase of the history was the amendment of the Columbia Basin 
Act in 1943, reducing the period of restriction to only five years.00 
This was done on the theory that ruinous speculation occurred 
only during the first years of a project's existence; after that time, 
as true settlers got on the land and put it into profitable produc-
tion, repayment was being made and the need for control was 
thought to be at an end. 60 
This theory was made explicit in 1949 when the Department of 
the Interior sought to limit the use of incremental value controls 
throughout reclamation administration to periods not exceeding 
five years. 61 Its position was that: 
The intent of the incremental value provision was to extend 
speculation control to nonexcess holdings and thereby, during 
the settlement and development periods, to stabilize land prices 
and prevent the over-capitalization of the lands by a failure to 
recognize the burden of unpaid construction costs, thus protect-
ing the investment of the settler and assuring the repayment 
of construction costs in accordance with the contract. 
In operation, it has become apparent that after a project has 
been developed and settled and the District has levied and col-
lected assessments to cover construction installments for a pe-
riod of years a need for control of speculation in nonexcess 
lands is materially lessened. 62 
Thus, the legislative history subsequent to 1926, while relevant, is 
in no sense determinative of the problem with which this article 
is concerned. 
59. 57 Stat. 14 (1943). 
60. 89 CONG. R..Ec. 1252-53 (1943); Hearings on H.R. 6522 (Part 2) and H.R, 7722 
Before the House Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation To Amend the Columbia 
Basin Project Act, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 234 (1942). 
61. H.R. REP. No. 448, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1949); Memorandum from the 
Commissioner of Reclamation to the Secretary of the Interior, June 16, 1948, approved, 
June 29, 1948 (copy in the author's possession). 
62. Memorandum, supra note 61, at 2. 
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IV. SPECULATION CONTROL: A MISCONCEPTION OF THE PROBLEM 
It should by now be clear that control of incremental value 
sales has always been viewed as a problem of control of speculation, 
and the existence of speculation has been measured by the ability 
of settlers to survive financially and to meet their repayment obli-
gations. Thus, in a loose sort of way the policy seems to have been 
that when control of incremental value sales on non-excess lands 
was necessary to secure the repayment obligation, they were em-
ployed; and when such controls were not needed for that purpose, 
they were abandoned. 
For this reason the issues upon which incremental value control 
policy has been determined through the years are quite unrelated to 
the question with which we are here concerned. That question-
upon which group of ·bona fide settlers the value is to be conferred 
as a reclamation benefit-is a totally separate issue. The mere fact 
that the repayment debt is current does not suggest that the selling 
settler is to be preferred over the buying settler or over the irriga-
tion district as a trustee for all those on the project. Indeed, as we 
shall see, every element of a rational reclamation policy sug-
gests that of all the available alternatives, that which gives the profit 
to the seller is the one wholly unacceptable solution. 
A. The Source of the Confusion 
In the early days of reclamation, permitting incremental profits 
to be taken was disastrous to recoupment of the repayment obliga-
tion, and therefore such profits were generally forbidden. Later, 
for a variety of reasons, it became possible for the United States to 
permit the taking of incremental profits (that is, to. grant that ad-
ditional value as a subsidy) and also to recoup its contracted-for re-
payment.68 The result was a repeal of the restrictions on .incre-
63. Though not essential to the analysis here, there is a revealing sidelight on 
congressional incremental value policy which deserves comment. As we have seen, all 
through the years the congressional attitude toward incremental value sales was 
.guided by the status of repayment. It was the original policy that the full costs of 
construction would be repaid by water users in a relatively short time. Theoretically, 
at least, reclamation policy has retained the principle of full recoupment of costs. 
However, the repayment obligation has been in fact greatly diminished under modem 
reclamation law. See note 4 supra. 
In this context, it is instructive to note that the movement to reduce, and then to 
eliminate, restrictions on incremental value sales began in the 1940's, shortly after the 
passage of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1187, 43 U.S.C. § 485 (1958). 
It was the Project Act which largely introduced the modern law of repayment with 
its greatly reduced obligations for irrigation users. Thus, while Interior Department 
officials and Congress urged the dropping of restrictions on incremental value sales 
on the ground ,that speculation was no longer a problem, what that view may really 
have meant was that speculation was no longer a problem because the repayment 
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mental profits. The trouble was that this repeal not only had the 
effect of allowing the incremental value-which was perfectly con-
sistent with reclamation policy-but also had the unconscious 
effect of permitting the selling settler to reap the value rather than 
retaining it for successors on the project., This came about because 
Congress apparently never considered that i11; distributing the ben-
efit of the incremental value, it would have to choose between com-
peting classes of bona fide settlers. It is this problem which Congress 
has never faced, 64 and which, as proposed here, should now be 
confronted directly for the first time. The following pages are de-
voted to an examination' of that problem of choice. 
B. Some Alternative Choices 
I. The Pioneer Theory: An Anachronism 
The first-generation settlers on any project have generally 
been able to acquire their land at pre-project values and then to 
obligation :had been minimized so that it no longer created financial difficulties for 
the purchasers of project water rights at incremented values. The problem of the 
double obligation was defeated, perhaps, not by an end of speculation (selling at 
· prices which included the market value of the water right), but by the reduction of 
repayment as a major economic obligation. 
If this is what actually happened, then the removal of incremental value restric• 
tions has helped to undermine, sub silentio, a key reclamation policy: the policy that 
substantial repayment of construction costs was to be assured before any incremental 
profits were to be allowed to any settler, whether seller or buyer. The policy has been 
undermined because the irrigators' repayment obligations have been greatly reduced 
on the ground that they are paying all they can afford, whereas we know they can 
afford to pay, and do pay, incremental values for project water rights. If congressional 
policy continues to hold that assuring substantial repayment is more important than 
permitting the reaping of incremental values, then the present system-whereby such 
profits arc allowed, but repayment is subsidized by power revenues or the general 
public-seems inconsistent with that policy. Would it not be more consistent with 
this policy to recapture incremental profits and use them ,to reduce the subsidy pro• 
vided by the other two sources? 
64. A principal purpose of the preceding discussion has been to show that there 
is no binding statutory intent which must determine ,the administrative or judicial 
attitude toward incremental values. Certainly it should be clear that the Omnibus 
Adjustment Act does not prohibit recapture of incremental values in non-excess land 
sales. Moreover, each of the recent e.xpress efforts to eliminate control of incremental 
value sales has been placed on a different ground, none of which indicates how Con• 
gress would react to the inter-settler problem posed here and none of which prohibits 
a change of policy to meet that proplem. Thus, the position taken by the Department 
of the Interior in the late 1940's turned on the assumption that ability to meet re· 
payment obligations was the critical issue, see te.xt accompanying note 62 supra; re• 
peal of the Arch-Hurley law was largely guided by problems of practical administra• 
tion, sec te.xt accompanying note 87 infra; suggested elimination of the Wellton-Mohawk 
provision was based on difficulties encountered by settlers in obtaining financing, sec 
te.xt accompanying note 69 infra; and the Columbia Basin provision repeal was sought 
on the ground that the project ought to be brought into conformity with other 
projects. Hearings on S. 3162 Before the Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation 
of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 87th Cong., 2d Scss. 5 (1962), 
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sell out at full market value. Is there any reason to let these earlier 
settlers reap this capital profit when they sell and carry it off the 
project to the detriment of successor settlers? 
The first response of those who defend the practice might be 
to show that this is the tradition of such programs. When the Uni-
ted States disposed of the public domain, as under the Homestead 
or Desert Land Acts, it was the first taker who was in a position to 
reap the benefit by acquiring land for virtually nothing and sell-
ing it for full market value. Not only is this traditional, the argu-
ment goes, but the problem is an inevitable one; someone must 
take the benefit at some point. Thus, the question might be re-
versed: why prefer the second or third settler to the first? In fact, it 
may be urged, there is a quite good reason for preferring the first 
settler. He is the one who had the courage to go on unsettled and 
untried land and to bring it into cultivation. In that sense he is 
being used as an instrumentality for promoting a national policy 
of land settlement, and the incremental value is a reward for that 
service which only the first settler performs.65 
The notion that the first settler should be rewarded for his 
efforts as a pioneer was undoubtedly a factor in disposing of the 
public domain, and it may have been consistent with early recla-
mation policy when Jand settlement was a principal goal and the 
original farmer really was a pioneer. However, it appears most 
ironically inappropriate today when reclamation policy and prac-
tice have taken an almost opposite direction. In order to get a 
typical reclamation project approved today, its proponents must 
demonstrate that the government investment will not open new 
lands to cultivation and thereby intensify existing agricultural sur- · 
phises. 00 The keynote of reclamation today is not land settlement, 
but land rescue. An advocate for a new project will argue that what 
is needed is a supplemental water supply to help existing farmers 
stabilize their existing operations. 
Under these circumstances, the first beneficiary of the project 
appears in quite a different light. In the traditional case, benefit 
65. This history is discussed. in HIBBARD, A HlsroRY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES 
(1939). The land may also have been a reward for services rendered, or to be rendered, 
in the military service. Id. at 116-35. 
66. It should be clear that modern reclamation policy is anything but a land set• 
tlement policy and that its beneficiaries are not the hardy pioneers of yore. See, e.g., 
70 Stat. 1059 (1956), 43 U.S.C. § 615K (1964); S. REP. No. 83, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 
(1961); 108 CONG. REc. 15669 (1962); 106 id. 18762, 15427 (1960); 103 id. 4749 (1957); 
102 id. 11940 (1956). Of course some new lands are brought into cultivation by new 
projects, but they are typically merely unused portions of well-settled areas. See, e.g., 
H.R. Doc. No. 444, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1960) (Mann Creek Project, Idaho). The 
Columbia Basin Project was probably the last great undertaking that really represented 
a policy of settling new lands. 
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worked both ways. The government wanted the land settled, and 
the pioneer fulfilled that desire~ for which he was duly rewarded. 
However, times have changed dramatically, and under today's cir-
cumstances it seems rather inappropriate to suggest that the original 
settler is entitled to the benefit of incremental land values on the 
ground that he was the one who put in "the thought, the hard 
work and the effort to make a going farm out of raw land."67 Far 
from being an agent who implements government policy by going 
on the public land and civilizing it-and who deserves a reward 
for his courage and hard work-the typical modem "first settler" 
resembles much more closely the welfare recipient, for he is already 
in business, needs help to preserve the business, and seeks that help 
from the United States. 
2. The Indifference Theory: Another Fallacy 
A second argument that might be advanced in favor of permit-
ting incremental profits is that if the United States is going to dis-
tribute the water-right value as part of its subsidy, the benefit is go-
ing to have to come to rest on some person at some point. That is, 
some settler is eventually going to reap the benefit, so it might as 
well be the first as the second or the fourth or the tenth. However, 
ihis way of putting the question wholly misstates the choice. It is not 
a question of whether settler number one or settler number two will 
take the capital profit. The real question is whether this value will 
be retained on the project for whoever happen to be the inhabitants 
at the time or whether it will be converted into cash and possibly be 
carried off the project to be used for purposes which are of no in-
terest or advantage to the reclamation program. 
If we say that the value belongs always to the persons coming 
on the project and stays with them only so long as they are project 
inhabitants, passing to the next generation and the next, then the 
benefit never comes to rest on any given person; it stays with the 
project as a project value. This approach is hardly a novel one, 
however foreign it may be to current reclamation administration. 
It merely embodies the principle that a government grant ought to 
be dispensed solely to achieve the purpose for which the money was 
appropriated and not to provide some unrelated windfall. For ex-
ample, a public welfare program is designed to aid needy people 
while -they are needy, and no longer; when one ceases to need wel-
fare, he cannot sell the right to receive monthly payments to an-
67. Hearings on H.R. 6522 the Columbia Basin Project Act Before the House 
Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1942). 
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other. It is the status of an individual, and not his personal identity, 
that determines the entitlement. Free textbooks are given to stu-
dents qua students; when they leave school, they must leave the 
books for their successors. The White House belongs to the current 
occupant of the Presidency. T!J.e application of this principle to 
reclamation should be obvious. The money Congress appropriates 
for reclamation is meant to be used to promote that program. The 
choice we are faced with is this: should that money, in the form of 
the water-right value, be retained in the project for present recla-
mation project inhabitants, or should we permit it to be converted 
into cash which the seller, who is withdrawing from the project, 
may use for purposes wholly unrelated to the goals of the reclama-
tion program? Is it not clear that the seller should relinquish his 
subsidy when he relinquishes his status on the project?68 
3. Use of Incremental Values as Loan Collateral: 
A Meritorious Argument and an Alternative Solution 
The only creditable argument which may be offered in support 
of current practice is based on the claim that a settler must "own" 
-the capital value of the water right to obtain necesary bank loans. 
The point has been made that banks are reluctant to loan money 
on lands encumbered with incremental value contracts.69 From this 
it has been concluded that if settlers are to be enabled to make the 
necessary borrowings, they must be free from incremental value re-
strictions, although this would, of course, also leave them free to 
sell the water right to a successor. This problem need in no way 
68. Undoubtedly this theory has implications beyond the reclamation laws. 
Wherever public funds are being spent, or public property being utilized, there is a 
question whether the expenditure is being used to advance the purpose for which it 
was made. See, e.g., Comment, Public Land Laws-Need for Revision, 39 N.Y.U.L. 
REv. 473, 496-97 (1964) (treatment of Taylor Grazing Act permits by the permittees as 
salable private property). Perhaps it is fair to characterize this article as an aspect of 
the broader struggle between the limited-grant concept and the windfall concept in 
the management of public resources. The dominance of the former approach today 
is illustrated by the changes which have taken place in federal mining law, where the 
old fee simple patent approach has in part yielded to leasing and multiple develop-
ment concepts. Compare REv. STAT. § 2325 (1875), 30 U.S.C. § 29 (1964), with 41 Stat. 
437 (1920), 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1964), and 68 Stat. 708 (1954), 30 U.S.C. §§ 521-26 (1964). 
Another aspect of this general problem is discussed in Mandelker, Controlling Land 
Values in Areas of Rapid Urban Expansion, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 734 (1965). 
69. Congress was told that ,this problem had created a serious impediment to set-
tlers who were subject to incremental value contracts on the Wellton-Mohawk Di-
vision of the Gila Project in Arizona. In consequence, the Senate and House Ap-
propriations Committees both recommended that the Secretary "carefully review those 
contracts in which such a provision exists, to eliminate it, and, if necessary, sub-
stitute some reasonable measure for controlling speculation." H.R. REP. No. 1460, 
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1954); S. REP. No. 1506, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1954); Hearings 
on H.R. 8680 Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 
1239-43 (1954). -
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impair the position being advanced here. What is desired is that 
project settlers have the use of the value of the water right as col-
lateral for improvement loans. This is a most admirable and sen-
sible objective; as presently implemented, however, it fails to take 
account of the fact that there will be turnover on the projects. 
Once we introduce the fact of mobility into this problem, we see 
that the grant of the water right as collateral inures largely to the 
benefit of the first settler. When he sells out at full market price, 
he takes that economic value with him off the project, and the rec-
lamation purpose which was served in giving him the value-the 
ability to borrow to improve project property-goes with him. 
Thus, we are back to the problem: why should the benefit be 
given only to the first generation settler? 
To be consistent with a rational reclamation policy, we would 
want to distribute the benefit of increased ability to borrow equally 
to every settler. In order properly to implement such a subsidy, the 
benefit should be available only while one is a settler and only 
for project purposes. There is, it seems, a simple and well-known 
way of achieving this purpose. The United States can guarantee 
loans made to project settlers for project purposes; the guarantee 
can provide the desired collateral without producing the improper 
side effects which now exist. 
C. The Most Equitable Solution: Retention of the 
Incremental Values in the Project 
The view suggested here-that attention should be focused on 
the project rather than on any individual settler-is corroborated 
by some other elements in the reclamation laws. For example, the 
old 1914 anti-speculation law70 was expressly designed to prevent 
profiteers from taking money out of the project to the detriment 
of the remaining settlers. Similarly, the law permitting outside sales 
of project water expressly requires that no such sales may be made 
unless in-project needs have first been met.71 From this perspective, 
the selling settler (assuming, as we have indicated, that he is en-
titled to no reward as a pioneer for past services rendered) is essen-
tially in the same situation as the pure speculator; he embodies the 
threat that the federal subsidy ·will be drained out of the project 
for uses which may not serve federal reclamation policy at all. 
This same conclusion can be dra·wn from another perspective. 
The idea that project settlers are entitled to reap incremental land 
70. 38 Stat, 686 (1914). 
71. 41 Stat. 451 (1920), 43 U.S.C. § 521 (1964); 36 Stat. 925 (1911), 43 U.S.C, § 523 
(1964). 
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values as profits is attributable, at least in some degree, to the no-
tion that under the repayment system the United States is selling, 
and the settlers are buying, the irrigation system.72 A buyer is, of 
course, entitled to the value of what he has bought. Nevertheless, 
even assuming that the characterization of the transaction as a sale 
is more or less accurate, 73 the real question is: who is the buyer? 
Under current practice, we are proceeding as if the individual 
water user is the buyer of that share of project water which he has 
used on his land. This is a most inaccurate assumption, however. 
Today the actual "buyer" is the irrigation or conservancy district, 
the agency which in fact has assumed the repayment obligation.74 
The district differs from the individual water users in several 
important ways. Although the individual water users as a_ group 
comprise the district and are thus coextensive with it, the extent 
of each user's right to share in district assets is not properly meas-
ured by the proportion of project water he uses, but rather by the 
proportion of the repayment obligation which he bears. These two 
£actors are frequently not the same. For example, a user of one per 
cent of the project water may very well not be paying one per cent of 
the repaym~nt contract, but under current administration he will 
reap one per cent of the incremental profits. The reasons for the dis-
parity between the share of water used and the share of repayment 
obligation borne are manifold. On many projects the construction 
cost obligation is calculated on the basis of acreage, not water use. 
Thus, those who grow thirsty crops and use much more water will 
pay as little as others with similar acreage, but much less water use.75 
Also, some projects charge construction costs to lands which are not 
in irrigation and are using no water.76 Another principal reason for 
the diversity in costs arises from the classification of water uses 
72. One of the most recent examples of the attempt to characterize the relation-
ship as a standard commercial transaction is found in Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. 
California, 47 Cal. 2d 597, 628-29, 306 P.2d 824, 843-44 (1957), rev'd sub nom. Ivanhoe 
Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 289, 299 (1958). _ 
73. As previously indicated, note 4 suprn, and as the Supreme Court has made 
eminently clear, the extent of the subsidy involved makes the comparison of the 
transaction to a sale accurate only in the most attenuated and superficial sense. See 
Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, supra note 72, at 299. 
74. Even the California court took the position in Ivanhoe that at the end of the 
repayment period it is the District which will "become the owner in trust for the 
water users within the District." 47 Cal. 2d at 630, 306 P .2d at 843. Although the 
California court was talking about ownership of the distribution works, it should be 
clear that as an economic matter the value of the works is reflected in the market 
price of the right to receive project water. 
75. E.g., Carlsbad Irrigation District, New Mexico; Hayden Lake Irrigation District, 
Idaho; Salt River Project, Arizona (letters to the author from district managers, Feb. 
1965). 
76. Roza Irrigation District, Washington (letter to author from district manager, 
Feb. 8, 1965). 
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based on land productivity.77 Similarly, municipal and industrial 
users may pay a much higher rate than agricultural users.18 In 
one district, agricultural users consume 85 per cent of the water but 
bear only 40.5 per cent of repayment burden.10 Another district 
charges each user a fixed dollar fee toward meeting the annual 
repayment obligation, regardless of the amount of water used.80 
In addition, the district may earn income from such activity as 
the selling of tmm sites or the leasing of grazing and farm lands. 
Under the reclamation law, profits from such sources are to be 
credited to repayment of project construction charges.81 Finally, 
to the extent that the actual repayment costs are underwritten by 
power revenues,82 there is a great disparity between the amount of 
water used and the share of construction costs borne.83 All of these 
instances are cited merely to show that it may make a considerable 
difference whether incremental values are turned over to the dis-
trict as an entity or to the individual user. 
Moreover, giving the values to the district would have another 
effect even more important than that of changing the distributive 
profile. Giving the values to the.district does not merely mean that 
they will be received by the constituents thereof, because the district 
undoubtedly will not, at least prior to the time repayment is com-
pleted, make a cash distribution to the persons on the project.84 
The district holds the money it receives in trust for the fulfillment 
of its primary obligations-operation of the project and repayment 
to the United States. If it received the incremental values, it might 
do one of several things. It could apply those values on the debt to 
the United States in order to reduce the taxes of the project's con-
stituents, 85 or it could expend the money on project improvements. 
77. E.g., Kittitas Reclamation District, Washington; Owl Creek Irrigation District, 
Wyoming; Gering-Fort Laramie Irrigation District, Nebraska (letters to author from 
district managers, Feb. 1965). 
78. E.g., Ventura River Municipal Water District, California; Solano Irrigation 
District, California; Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District, Arizona (let• 
ters to author from district managers, Feb. and April 1965). 
79. Eastern Municipal Water District, California (letter to author from district 
manager, March 2, 1965). 
80. Lewiston Orchards Irrigation District, Idaho (letter to author from district 
manager, Feb. 8, 1965). 
81. 43 Stat. 703 (1924), 43 U.S.C. § 501 (1964). 
82. See note 4 supra. 
83. Letter ,to author from general manager of the Imperial Irrigation District, 
California, Feb. 15, 1965. 
84. The congressional attitude toward such distributions seems to be indicated 
in 43 Stat. 703 (1924), 43 U.S.C. § 501. (1964). 
85. The manner in which such monies might be applied in liquidation of the re• 
payment obligation can vary considerably. Using the money to meet current obliga• 
tions, and there.by reduce current taxes, would be most favorable to the settlers and 
least favorable to the United States. If the monies were used first to pay off the laat 
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In either of these ways the values would be used in the manner dis-
cussed in the foregoing subsection; they would be retained in the 
project for the accomplishment of project aims and ends. Such a 
result would seem to be far more consistent with reclamation policy 
than is the present administration, which permits the use of a public 
subsidy to enrich individuals who are free to apply the money re-
ceived to non-project purposes. 
From the foregoing discussion, it seems fair to conclude that pro-
hibiting incremental value sales is consistent with true congressional 
policy, not because settlers should be denied this benefit, but rather 
because such sales give the values to the wrong settlers. It is the 
failure to see the issue in this light that has made the legislative 
history seem such a tangled mess. 
The legal conclusion to which we have now come is indeed a 
simple one. It is that the money for which a reclamation-project 
water right is sold or leased (whether by itself or along with the land 
irrigated) does not belong to the sell~r, but should be recovered by 
tlie irrigation or conservancy district-the repayment obligor-to be 
held in trust and used for the benefit of the present project com-
munity.86 · 
It must be emphasized that the proposal made here is not merely 
an indirect scheme for arguing that reclamation water prices are set 
too low. This article accepts the fact that Congress desires to subsi-
dize reclamation; it <;mly suggests that the existing subsidy should be 
redistributed. It is of course true that if repayment obligations are 
adjusted upward, approaching market costs, the opportunity for 
dollar of debt due (i.e., a dollar not due for fifty years, which dollar is on loan interest 
free) in advance, the scheme would be vastly ,more favorable to the United States. See 
note 63 supra; see also 52 Stat. 211 (1938); 50 Stat. 208 (1937). A third alternative would 
be to use recovered incremental values to pay off irrigation costs allocated to power 
revenues, thus reducing the subsidy which irrigators receive. This approa~, of course, 
would not benefit the project settlers, but rather the power users or the general public. 
Any of these alternatives would be acceptable under the theory of this article, and each 
would be far more consistent with a rational reclamation policy than is the present 
system. 
The district, under this proposal, should be entitled to receive incremental values 
permanently. The time limitation in the 1926 act, formulated for a different purpose, 
should not bar a new result based on newly discovered issues. Cf. 68 I.D. 372 (1961) 
(Op. Sol., Dept. Int. No. M-36634). . 
86. When incremental value sales have been restricted in the past, it has been 
customary for the district to recapture only some fraction of the incremental value, 
usually 50%, and to permit the seller to keep the balance for himself. E.g., Arch-
Hurley Project, 52 Stat. 211 (1938); Owyhee Contract, supra note 50, art. 41(1). Some-
times a more complex sliding scale has been employed, requiring the seller to repay 
between 50% and 99% of the incremented value. Columbia Basin Project, 50 Stat. 208 
(1937). Such devices, obviously designed to promote alienability by giving the land-
owner some incentive -to sell, are unobjectionable. Hearings on S. 2172 Before the 
Senate Committee ·on Irrigation and Reclamation, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1937). 
Other adjustments that would have to be made are discussed in note 88 infra. 
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profit-taking would be destroyed and the problem at issue here 
would automatically be solved. It is also true that a problem of how 
to house condemned prisoners would be terminated by abolishing 
capital punishment, but one who proposes a solution to the housing 
problem should not be viewed as advocating, or even as implicitly 
passing judgment upon, the abolition of capital punishment. The 
two issues are quite separable. There seems little reason to believe 
that the subsidy will be withdrawn imminently; while it remains, 
the important, independent problem of distribution ought to be 
solved. It remains now only to suggest how the solution proposed 
can practicably be implemented. . 
V. PRACTICAL ADMINISTRATION 
The practical problems of administering the proposal suggested 
here are essentially of three kinds. First, to what extent are exist-
ing contracts and existing state laws a bar to modification of present 
practices? Second, to what extent does longstanding administrative 
practice bar a change in that practice, absent express congressional 
authorization? Third, can the redistribution of values be achieved 
without invoking some terribly complex and expensive administra-
tive machinery to determine what monies are being misapplied? 
The third problem is the most troublesome, and it may be helpful 
to dispose of it first. 
A. Complex Administrative Machinery Is Unnecessary 
Previous attempts to regulate incremental value sales have had 
little success in finding an easy means for determining that portion 
of a sale price which is to be designated as a windfall.87 The dif-
ficulty arises in part because most transactions are sales of farms at 
a gross price which includes, without specific allocation, the value 
of the land, improvements, and ·water. The problem is, therefore, 
the isolation and recoupment of that amo1:1nt which represents the 
actual value of the water right. 88 
87. E.g., S. REP. No. 1156, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) (repealing the incremental 
value requirement in the Arch-Hurley Law). 
88. The district would not recover the full market value of the water right. The ~ 
seller would be given credit for any increment he had paid his vendor. He might also 
be given credit for amounts he had already contributed toward the repayment obliga-
tion. This has apparently been the practice in incremental value contracts. LAND• 
OWNERSHIP SURVEY 48. See also note 86 supra, suggesting another adjustment that 
might be necessary. 
Theoretically, it would be simpler to prevent water rights from being sold at all 
and to hold instead that the rights pass automatically and without charge to suc-
cessor landowners. However, ·there seems to be no practical way of assuring that water 
would not be sold anyway in the form of increased land prices. 
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The methods thus far utilized to isolate that value have been 
quite complex. The traditional approach required an appraisal of 
the land, the individual improvements on each farm, the construc-
tion charges paid, and "other items of value that are proper."89 
Since improvements were continuously being made, any attempt to 
be accurate in allocation of values involved frequent reappraisals.90 
When all these values were ascertained, their sum was viewed as 
representing the total value of the property without reference to 
the project. Any excess over this amount was considered an incre-
mental value which the United States was entitled to recover. 
In addition to complexity, this approach obviously involved an-
other serious flaw. By treating the entire excess over appraised value 
as an increment attributable solely to the existence of the project, 
this method failed to recognize that other factors-such as. general 
inflation or proximity to budding urban development-also affect 
land prices.91 Disillusionment with such misleading rigidities and 
with the above complexities has undoubtedly enhanced congressional 
sympathy for requests to repeal existing incremental value laws. 
The question here is whether any attempt to recover incremental 
values is necessarily doomed to similar administrative difficulties. 
Prior attempts have bogged down, in part, because they sought to 
deduce the value of the water right from a mass ·of other data in an 
elimination process. It might, however, be possible to approach the 
issue directly, that is, by finding the independent market value of 
the irrigation water. If we can discover this, then for any sale we 
need only find the amount of water involved in the transfer (which 
is easy and obvious, since it is the amount the project is delivering 
to the land or individual in question), multiply it by the market 
value per acre foot of water, and hold that that sum92 is owed to the 
project by the vendor. The specific consideration is thus whether 
project water has an ascertainable market value. 
Certainly in many irrigation areas it is not customary to think 
in terms of the value of water rights as such. If inquiry were to be 
made concerning the unit value of project water, a common answer 
might be that "it is the value of the land, and not the acre foot of 
water •.. that is the yardstick."93 But the mere custom that water 
89. E.g., 57 Stat. 14 (1943) (Columbia Basin Project). 
90. Ibid. 
91. S. REP, No. 1156, supra note 87. 
92. Properly adjusted, as explained in notes 86 and 88 supra. 
93. Letter to the author from the general manager of the Salt River Project, 
Arizona, Feb. 24, 1965. Farmers frequently use irrigated land as the measure of value 
and do not attach any price to water rights alone. Letters to the author from Terra 
Bella Irrigation District, California, Feb. 15, 1965, and Vale-Oregon Irrigation Dis-
trict, Oregon, Feb. 1965. 
0 
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right values, as such, are not generally used does not mean that they 
cannot be ascertained. The following comments are designed to sug-
gest that such values may not be nearly so elusive as past experience 
· seems to indicate. 
On many projects, users are allowed to sell or lease their water 
rights for a valuable consideration. While permanent sales seem to 
be relatively uncommon at the present time,94 temporary leasing 
of water on an annual basis appears to be quite widespread.90 One 
of the truisms of the marketplace is that the capital value of prop-
erty can easily be ascertained from its annual rental value. Thus, in 
any project where selling or leasing is at all common, calculation of 
the market value of water rights per acre foot should be rather 
easy.96 This value can, of course, be applied to determine the value 
of the water right in the sale of a farm for an undifferentiated total 
price. 
In addition, a good deal of market information is ordinarily 
94. As previously noted, sales are permitted on the Colorado-Big Thompson 
Project. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. In addition, the following arc a 
few examples of projects where permanent transfers of water rights arc permitted: 
American Falls Reservoir District, Idaho (letter to author from manager, Feb. 1965); 
Carlsbad Irrigation District, New Mexico (letter to author from manager, Feb. 20, 
1965); Collbran Conservancy District, Colorado (Rules and Regulations for Realloca• 
tion and Transfer of Water Allotments 9, Dec. 7, 1961); Fremont-Madison Irrigation 
District, Idaho (letter to author from manager, Feb. 1965); Provo River Water Users 
Association, Utah (letter ,to author from manager, Feb. 15, 1965); Strawberry Water 
Users Association, Utah (letter to author from manager, Feb. 11, 1965); Washoe 
County Water Conservation District, Nevada (letter to author from manager, Feb. 
1965). 
The Fremont-Madison District reported that it had only one permanent sale in 
1964; the American Falls Reservoir District reported three; and the Strawberry District 
reported that transfers are "quite infrequent." 
95. The Carlsbad Irrigation District, New Mexico, reports that "because we arc 
chronically short of water to supply the water rights of the District we have many 
transfers •••• We estimate that approximately 3,200 acre feet of water was transferred 
during 1965." Letter to author from manager, Feb. 20, 1965. 
The Boise Project Board of Control, which operates five irrigation districts, re• 
ports that "at times the transfer of allotted water reaches fair proportions • • • • Dur• 
ing the season of 1961, which was one of short supply, a good many of the summer's 
allotments changed hands for as much as $8.00 an acre foot." Letter to author from 
manager, March 1, 1965. 
In addition -to those cited above and in note 94 supra, a number of districts reported 
that they permitted annual leasing, without indicating how frequent or widespread 
such leasing is. E.g., Form Authorizing Transfer of Water From One Parcel of Land 
to Another Parcel of Land Under Different Ownerships, Lindmore Irrigation District, 
California (Rules and Regulations Adopted Jan. 8, 1963); letter to author from superin• 
tendent of the Mirage Flats Irrigation District, Nebraska, Feb. 26, 1965; letter to author 
from manager of Reeves County Water Improvement District No. I, Texas, Feb. 23, 
1965; letter to author from manager of the Stone Corral Irrigation District, California, 
March 15, 1965. 
96. To be sure, former sales or leases are not a flawless indicator of current value. 
Prices paid may reflect, for example, a itime of especially intense shortage or a trans• 
action not at arms' length; furthermore, what one farmer paid another may not 
represent what a farmer could get from a city. Nevertheless, such market imperfections 
pervade every appraisal process. 
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available from related transactions in the general community. For 
example, the average differential between the cost of irrigated and 
non-irrigated land is a significant guide to the value of a water right.111 
Moreover, local sales of ditch company stock and ground water 
rights, condemnations, municipal water rates, and the like, all are 
important indicators of water right values.98 To be sure, there are 
individual differences and market imperfections which make any 
such process of evaluation speculative and approximate. Neverthe-
less, there is considerable experience in the evaluation of water 
rights which suggests that no insuperable barriers need be antici-
pated. It is quite common, for example, to have to find the value 
of water rights in order to ascertain the base upon which water 
company rates are to be calculated.99 Such an evaluation must also 
be made whenever a municipality condemns water rights to supply 
its residents.100 Moreover, the courts are already familiar with the 
problem of determining the difference in land values with and 
without water rights.101 Of course, determination of market values 
"is largely a matter of opinion,"102 and this would be particularly 
true in areas where there is an inactive market in water rights. 
However, this difficulty has been met in water right appraisal pro-
ceedings in the same manner as it has in other areas.103 
97. The manager of the Klamath Basin Improvement District reported that when 
land gets a water right, its value jumps "from around $50.00 per acre to between 
$200.00 and $250.00 per acre • • • ." Letter to author from the secretary-treasurer, 
March 30, 1965. Similarly, a report from the Tulelake Irrigation District notes that 
"land with a water right is worth twice as much as land without a water right." Letter 
to author from the manager, Feb. 17, 1965. 
98. Such data are available even in states with appurtenance rules which seem to 
prohibit any transactions in water rights alone. This is made clear by a leading au-
thority in the field. Dean Trelease, in Severance of Water Rights From Wyoming 
Lands 2 ((1960) WYOMING LEGISLATIVE REsEAitCH COMM,, REP. No. 2), notes that there 
are ten kinds of transactions allowed in Wyoming which permit the transfer of water 
without appurtenant land. He concludes that "the exceptions already made have al-
most swallowed the rule." Id. at 36. He has also concluded, however, that despite the 
exceptions, the market for water rights alone in Wyoming is an exceedingly limited 
one. Letter to author, April 9, 1965. · 
99. E.g., McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400 (1926); San Joaquin &: 
King's River Canal&: Irrigation Co. v. County of Stanislaus, 233 U.S. 454 (1914); Reno 
Power, Light &: Water Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 300 Fed. 645 (D. Nev. 1921); Osborn 
Util. Corp. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 52 Idaho 571, 17 P.2d 333 (1932). 
100. E.g., Safranek v. Town of Limon, 123 Colo. 330, 228 P .2d 975 (1951); Village 
of Lapwai v. Alligier, 69 Idaho 397, 207 P.2d 1025 (1949); Moyle v. Salt Lake City, 111 
Utah 201, 176 P.2d 882 (1947); Sigurd City v. State, 105 Utah 278, 142 P.2d 154 (1943). 
101, E.g., United States v. Twin City. Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 237 n.9 (1956) 
(condemnation); Shurbet v. United States, - F.2d - (5th Cir. 1965) (cost depletion of 
ground water). 
102. Montana Ry. v. Warren, 137 U.S. 348, 353 (1890). 
103. "It should be measured by the fair market value of a similar water right in 
the locality, or a similar locality, if such can be established by satisfactory evidence. 
If no market value can be established, then the opinion of competent witnesses as 
to the actual value may be considered. In this respect the case does not .present any 
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To be sure, valuation of property is often quite unsatisfactory. 
Whether reclamation water rights can be satisfactorily evaluated is 
simply unknown at the present time. There is at least some reason 
to believe that market prices are reasonably ascertainable. Congress 
ought to be willing to try the experiment; much might be gained, 
and there is nothing more to lose. 
B. State Laws and Existing Contracts Present No Barriers 
There remain now only the questions whether state law, existing 
contracts, or longstanding practices are a bar to implementation of 
the interpretation proposed here. Objections based upon state law 
are easily disposed of. The suggestions embodied in this article are 
based upon an interpretation of federal reclamation law. To follow 
these suggestions is to implement congressional intent. To the extent 
that any state law is inconsistent therewith, it is superseded by virtue 
of the supremacy clause of the federal constitution. 
The absence of implementing contractual provisions is more in-
convenient, but not fatal. It would certainly be useful to have a con-
tract provision spelling out the details for appraisal and the man-
ner in which incremental profits are to be recovered and used.104 
However, the absence of such specifics does not impair the right of 
the United States and the district to demand of the seller that he 
turn over his incremental profits. The right to be asserted exists 
by virtue of federal law, not by virtue of contract. It can be vindi-
cated in a judicial proceeding if voluntary compliance cannot be 
effected. Though cumbersome, the necessary machinery for appraisal 
exceptional features. The same rule is applied in the case of any property, real or 
personal." Murray v. Public Util. Comm'n, 27 Idaho 603, 150 Pac. 47, 51 (1915). Parallel 
sales are, of course, the best evidence of market value. l ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER 
EMINENT DOMAIN § 137, at 582 (2d ed. 1953). Where such sales are unavailable, the 
courts readily tum to the best evidence they can find. This may be more or less 
comparable sales, Sac &: Fox Tribe of Indians v. United States, 340 F.2d 368, 370 
(Ct. Cl. 1964), or it may be mere opinion evidence if no transactions are available to 
help arrive at a price. United States v. 13255.53 Acres, 158 F.2d 874, 876 (3d Cir. 
1946). Moreover, where no comparable sales are available, the courts can always tum 
to such collateral evidence of value as the cost of obtaining an alternate supply. Village 
of Lapwai v. Alligier, 69 Idaho 397, 207 P .2d 1025 (1949). 
104. It would also be useful to have had a statute expressly spelling out the policy 
conclusion which this article has reached by implication from fragments here and 
there. It is well known that the Department of Interior is "constantly experiencing 
protests" even when it acts "to implement specific congressional requirements." Hear• 
ings on S. 3162 Before the Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation of the Senate 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1962) (Testimony 
of Associate Solicitor Weinberg). However, as is indicated in the concluding pages, 
this is an issue without a present constituency and therefore one which may need first 
to be advocated in a judicial forum. 
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and recovery can be worked out in the form of a judicial decree. 
Victory in a few such lawsuits might induce renegotiation of existing 
contracts in order to work out a practical procedure less compli-
cated than litigation for all parties concerned. 
C. Past Administrative Practices Are Not Binding 
Finally, there is the question of the effect of present a~inistra-
tive practice. While longstanding practice is suggestive of a proper 
interpretation of the law, the courts have made clear in recent years 
that it is only suggestive and not binding. Error does not become 
truth merely by virtue of antiquity.105 The real question is whether 
the legislature can be viewed as having approved the policy which 
is being achieved by current administrative interpretation. Cer-
tainly the foregoing discussion ought to be persuasive that no such 
argument is properly available in this case. The legislative history 
of this problem only demonstrates that Congress has been led first 
one way and then another because false issues and erroneous choices 
have been put before it. Congress has never considered the inter-
pretation proposed here.106 Since the administrative agency, the 
Department of the Interior, has taken various positions at various 
times in accord with its evaluation of current needs, there is no rea-
son why it cannot vary its position once again, leaving it to Congress 
to reject the choice if it desires to do so. The Department has in 
the past taken a broad view of its authority to deal with incremental 
values; it is time to exercise that broad authority again. 
105. Administrative interpretations, however longstanding, will not and should not 
stop a court from making its own determination of what Congress intended. United 
States v. City &: County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 31-32 (1940). Moreover, the ex-
ecutive agency is entitled to change its mind about ·the proper interpretation of a 
statute and thus to initiate such a judicial determination. FPC v. Union Elec. Co., 381 
U.S. 90, 110 n.30, 113 (1965); United States v. Dupont &: Co., 353 U.S. 586, 590 (1957). 
See generally 71 I.D. 498, 516-17 (1964) (Op.,Sol., Dept. Int., No. M-36675). This is not 
to deny that an agency's interpretation is "entitled to great respect" where the agency 
seeks to have a court confirm that interpretation. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. I, 18 
(1965). The point made here is the quite different one that an agency which desires to 
change its view of a statute is not barred from doing so by its own previous interpre-
tation to the contrary. 
While it is surely true that economic expectations are based upon prerent inter-
pretation and will be disappointed by a change, that fact is not conclusive against a 
change in interpretation. See generally Comment, Prospective Overruling and Retro-
active Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962). It might, however, 
suggest the desirability of applying the change prospectively only. Such an interpreta-
tion would protect vendors in sales already consummated and also banks which have 
made loans with the water right as security. Ibid. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 
618 (1965); Griflin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 26 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
106. In any event, congressional inaction in the face of administrative practice, 
though relevant, is never conclusive evidence of approval of such practice. Zemel v. 
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 18 (1965). 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION 
In the past, suggestions that incremental value contracts be used 
have taken the form of an argument that the United States should 
recapture for itself a benefit which it had formerly bestowed on its 
citizens. Such an approach is obviously always an unpopular one. 
The unique factor about the proposal made here is that it need 
involve no such unattractive suggestion. It does not require the re-
capture of aid previously given. Instead, it urges that the wrong 
people have been enriching themselves at the expense of their fellow 
citizens. Unfortunately, however, those fellow citizens who are being 
cheated are not likely to join forces and seek to vindicate their 
rights. The reason is that the victims are largely the future genera-
tion of people on the projects, and the victimizers are the present 
occupants. Thus, the victims are inadequately represented by the 
settlers now on the projects and by the district management, which, 
of course, is dra·wn from the present population.107 
There is one partial exception to this problem, and it may sug-
gest a good place to begin enforcement of the new interpretation. 
On ~t least some projects-the Colorado-Big Thompson is a good 
example-the future generation of buyers and users does have a 
present existence. The project area is urbanizing, and the future 
buyers are largely the municipalities in the project, which are ac-
quiring water from agricultural users. It is to their benefit that in-
cremental values be retained in the project, for project purposes, 
rather than being taken away by settlers who are selling their in-
terests in the project lands. Moreover, since they buy water rights in 
gross, certain of the complex technical problems of valuation need 
not be encountered. This might be a very attractive opportunity to 
test the new theory. 
107. As Senator Douglas has pointed out, the same sort of problem is presented by 
the excess land law, where the intended beneficiaries of the law "are persons in the 
future. They do not exist at present. Since they exist only in the future and not in 
the present, they lack voices and are in a sense unrepresented." 108 CONG, REc. 5711 
(1962). 
